This paper provides new evidence on the substitutability between private and pension wealth by exploiting the Italian pension reform of 1992. We use a difference-in-difference estimator that exploits the differential effects of the reform on individuals belonging to several year-of-birth cohorts and different occupational groups. We nd convincing evidence that saving rates increase as a result of a reduction in pension wealth. By allowing for the possibility that substitutability changes with age, we nd that substitutability is particularly high (and precisely estimated) for workers between 35 and 45.
I. INTRODUCTION
The characterization of the determinants of households' saving decisions is crucially important both for providing a framework capable of explaining the accumulation of wealth and for a wide variety of policy issues. According to the life cycle theory, individual savings depend, among other things, on the amount of resources available (through public pensions) after retirement, when earnings typically peter out. While the inverse relation between future bene t entitlements and household saving seems intuitive and natural, whether public pension wealth constitutes a perfect substitute for nancial savings is an empirical question that has not been settled. The aim of this paper is to measure the elasticity of household saving to changes in future pension entitlements. This elasticity is obviously related to the degree of substitutability between pension and bequeathable wealth. Such an exercise is of crucial importance to public policy, especially when, as in most Western economies, major reforms of the pension systems are being considered.
There are several reasons why pension wealth might not be a good substitute for nancial saving: future pension bene ts are not liquid and cannot be borrowed against; individuals might be liquidity constrained at some points in time; the implicit rate of return on pensions is not the same as that on nancial savings. 1 In other words, nancial and insurance markets arrangements (including tax treatment of pension and nancial instruments) and different welfare provisions may produce a variety of observed saving patterns and of substitutability results.
Given the importance of the topic, it is somewhat surprising that little empirical evidence exists on the relationship between the provision of public pensions and individual household savings. Feldstein [1974] provided some time series evidence on such a link for the United States. He estimated a simple consumption function that included, in addition to current income and nancial wealth, an aggregate estimate of household social security wealth and found a signi cant and positive effect of all three variables. The coef cient on social security wealth was, in some cases, larger than that on nancial wealth. King and Dicks-Mireaux [1982] , instead, considered the relationship in a microeconomic data set. As they considered a single Canadian cross section, they focused on the relationship between the stock of saving and the present discounted value of future bene ts. In their study, they expressed both of these variables as the ratio to an estimate of permanent income. Their methodology, which consisted of estimating the degree of substitutability between nancial and pension wealth, was subsequently used and extended by Hubbard [1986] on U. S. data and by Brugiavini [1987] and Jappelli [1995] on Italian data. Diamond and Hausman [1984] and Samwick [1997] have also used micro data for the United States and the estimated offset between the two stock measures is about 20 percentage points. However, with the exception of the recent papers by Gustman and Steinmeier [1998] and Gale [1998] , not many recent advances have been made through direct household level data, and no consensus has been reached on the order of magnitude of the substitutability parameter. It is particularly surprising that while a urry of pension reforms is taking place in Europe, the evidence on the 1. Contributions to the pension system, whether perceived as forced saving or as taxes, can distort labor supply choices, particularly if the pension system is not actuarially fair. To be more precise, the relationship between contributions on the one hand and accrual rate of expected pension bene ts on the other hand may determine the timing of retirement decisions as well as the level of the labor supply.
relationship between bequeathable wealth and pension wealth and on the likely impact of the reforms on asset accumulation is scanty and inconclusive. Recent papers by Alessie, Kapteyn, and Klijn [1997] and Euwals [2000] reach mixed conclusions on the relationship between the two forms of wealth. As the authors point out, there is a basic problem with the true source of variability available in the estimated pension wealth variable.
This lack of evidence is partly due to the inherent dif culty in measuring public pension (or social security 2 ) wealth and partly to the fact that observed cross-sectional differences in saving behavior can be due to a variety of factors observed and unobserved. The presence of unobserved heterogeneity makes it difcult to identify the effect that different endowments of social security wealth have on different individuals' saving behavior. In this paper we use changes in public pension wealth to identify the effect of social security entitlements on household savings. For such a purpose we use a time series of Italian cross sections, some collected just before and others after a major reform of the social security system.
As discussed below, the Italian social security system, started in the early 1970s, became progressively more generous and, by the end of the 1980s, clearly unsustainable. In September 1992 the Amato government introduced the rst of a series of important reforms. By changing retirement age, eligibility, early retirement arrangements, and so on, the 1992 reform induced a substantial reduction in the pension wealth of many Italian households. What is more relevant for our exercise, however, is that the reform changed the pension wealth of observable groups of households in different ways. Typically, public sector, younger, and educated employees were affected more than relatively older, private sector, and uneducated employees. In what follows, we exploit this variability to identify the elasticity of personal savings to public pension wealth by comparing the changes of these different groups.
Italian households have always been characterized by a remarkably high saving rate. In the last two decades, however, the personal saving rate has declined by about 10 percentage points.
2. The term social security seems to have different uses in the United States on the one hand, and in the United Kingdom and the rest Europe, on the other hand. In this paper we will be using the U. S. meaning and consider social security and public pension wealth ("pension wealth") as synonymous. In fact, in Italy there are basically no occupational pension plans.
Several authors have tried to explain both the remarkable levels of Italian households' saving rates and their subsequent large fall. Visco [1994, 1995] have explained part of the decline that occurred during the 1980s, as directly caused by the reforms of the social security system which took place during the 1970s. While these seemed minor changes at the time of their introduction, they had a major impact on the system, by making current and future bene ts to retirees more generous than the contributions paid to the system by the same individuals. The immediate effect of these changes has been a substantial growth of social security wealth for some groups of the population and particularly for retirees and generations of active individuals close to retirement (as opposed to future generations). If Italian households perceived social security wealth as a close substitute for private life-cycle-wealth, this increased generosity could have resulted in a signi cant increase in the propensity to consume for those who bene ted most from the system. Such a generous de ned bene t system, based on a pay-asyou-go nancing method and coupled with the recent demographic trends, was bound to generate a growing de cit of the Italian social security system. Hence, the 1992 reform has been the rst (much-needed) reaction to the structurally unstable situation of the Italian old age public insurance system. It has undoubtedly marked a turning point in the dynamic behavior of the social security wealth: many individuals had the value of their future pension bene ts substantially curtailed. Furthermore, the 1992 reform received much attention by the press and was largely debated on television and radio programs: the importance of the changes brought about by the reform could not go unnoticed. In 1993, the year following the Amato Reform, the saving rate of Italian households increased considerably. Obviously, it is not possible to attribute the change entirely to the reform of the social security system. Many things happened between 1992 and 1993, including the fact that the economy entered a substantial recession. With the same Act with which it changed the social security system, the Government introduced a number of measures aimed at re-equilibrating the Italian scal situation.
3
For this reason, we rely on a difference-in-difference estimator 3. Miniaci and Weber [1999] provide a detailed analysis into the causes of the 1993 recession and found a relevant role played by the 1992 social security reform.
that exploits the differential effect of the reform on different groups' pension wealth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we brie y summarize the existing literature on the relationship between saving and pension wealth and present a very simple model that will provide the framework to specify and interpret our empirical results. In Section III we start by illustrating some recent trends of Italian household saving. We then sketch the main changes introduced by the 1992 reform and use some of the features of the law to present some rst evidence of the effect that it had on household savings. In particular, we use the fact that the law had very different effects on individuals with more than or less than fteen years of contribution tenure in 1992 to estimate the effect on saving rates by regression discontinuity design. We then move on to illustrate the changes that the law had on our estimates of individual pension wealth. In Section IV we present our results on the effect of social security wealth on individual saving rates. To identify these effects, we directly exploit the differential effect that the law had on different groups of Italian households.
II. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PENSION WEALTH AND SAVING: A SIMPLE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Our approach is different from those used in the papers in the saving literature for two reasons. First, we consider the relationship between public pension wealth, as measured by the present discounted value of future entitlements, on the saving rate of individual households. That is, unlike Feldstein [1974] and subsequent papers, we use individual rather than aggregate data, and unlike King and Dicks-Mireaux [1982] , Hubbard [1986] , Brugiavini [1987] , and Jappelli [1995] , we use ows instead of stocks. Second, we use the variation in pension wealth induced by a large legislative change that occurred in Italy in 1992 to identify the parameters of interest. This approach allows us to control for the possible presence of xed effects both at the individual and at the group level. Our econometric approach and identi cation strategy are similar to those used by Krueger and Pischke [1992] to analyze the labor supply effects of the unexpected "bene t notch" affecting U. S. workers born after 1916. Krueger and Pischke use differences in the changes in social security across generations and over time to study labor supply responses.
In this section we rst sketch a very simple model, which is useful to justify the empirical speci cation we use and interpret the empirical results we present below. The model is nothing new. However, it is useful to make the (somewhat obvious) point that changes in future pension entitlements have different effects on saving rates for people at different points in their lifetime. We need to make this relationship precise as it will inform our empirical speci cation, which we present in subsection II.A. Finally, we discuss our econometric strategy.
II.A. A Simple Model
Within the framework of a life cycle model, there is an obvious relationship between publicly provided pension bene ts and the saving rates during the working life of a generic household. A permanent and unexpected reduction in an individual's social security wealth implies an increase in her savings and a reduction in her current consumption. This behavior is explained by an increased desire to provide resources for consumption after retirement. More generally, for individuals who are not at a corner, that is, those who are not consuming the maximum they can, changes in their pension wealth would induce a change in their consumption and saving behavior. 4 As we want to estimate such a relationship, however, it is worth it to make it precise so as to determine the variables we want to consider in the empirical speci cation and how to interpret the coef cients we estimate.
As we are interested in obtaining closed-form solutions to characterize mainly saving for retirement behavior, we consider a version of the model without uncertainty. This choice, which simpli es our discussion considerably, is not fully consistent with the consideration of an "unexpected" change in pension wealth at some point in the life cycle. We do not think, however, that a complete treatment of uncertainty would add much to the ideas we want to consider.
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Because we want to consider the differential effect that changes in pension wealth have on individuals of different ages, 4. As we argue in footnote 1 above, in principle, labor supply can be affected. In this paper we do not consider these effects. Neither do we explicitly consider the possibility that intergenerational altruism undoes the changes in social security wealth. 5. It is obviously possible that the precautionary motive induced by uncertainty could interact with the retirement motive. This is particularly true if the higher retirement savings induced by a reduction in public pension wealth could be used to smooth out business cycle uctuations and therefore reduce the motive for precautionary saving.
we have to consider at least three periods. Moreover, as we want to consider individuals who have been affected by a (presumably unanticipated) reform in the year we observe them, and individuals who were affected by such a reform in the past, we have to consider at least four periods. We assume that people work during the rst three periods of their lives and then retire. Labor supply is exogenous and is compensated with a deterministic level of earning. When people retire, they receive a certain level of bene ts b. For simplicity, we assume that the utility function is isoelastic. Formally, a generic individual solves the following maximization problem:
1 2 g subject to
Earnings in the three periods ( y i , i 5 1, 2, 3) should be interpreted as net earnings. r is the constant interest rate, b the discount factor, and 1/g the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The solution of this problem is trivial. In particular, it is easy to show that
. For a consumer aged 1, the saving plan for the second and third periods are given by
Equations (3) and (4) can be used to derive the effect on secondand third-period saving (and consumption) of an anticipated change in pension wealth. However, if we want to consider the effect of an unanticipated change in pension wealth on consumption and wealth for a consumer aged two or three, at the current age, we have to consider the reoptimization problem of this individual who has saved a certain amount in period 1 (and 2). The reoptimization will yield saving rates as
where A i is accumulated private wealth in the ith period. For a consumer who does not reoptimize in period 2 or in period 3, equations (39) and (49) will be equivalent to equations (3) and (4), respectively, as it can be checked by substituting the expressions for the current level of assets A 1 and A 2 . For an age-two consumer who is affected by a surprise change in the second period of her life, the relevant expression is (39), that takes the decisions made in period 2 as given. Analogously, for an age-three consumer, the relevant expression is (49).
Finally, if we consider an age-three consumer who, in the second period of her life was affected by a surprise change in pension wealth, one gets the expression
Once again, if we assume that there are no surprises, equation (40) is equivalent to (49) and (4). However, with surprises, equation (40) is the relevant one for a consumer who has received a surprise in period 2 and is observed in period 3.
The expressions above make clear, within the framework of a very simple model, how to discount future bene ts and how to relate them to the current level of saving rates. The point we want to stress is that the relationship depends not only on how far away the consumer is from retirement, but also on when in her life cycle she experiences the reform and when she is observed by the econometrician relative to the surprise reform. Gale [1998] has recently stressed the importance of the different planning horizon for individuals of different ages. Our framework also stresses (and our empirical work exploits) a related implication of a standard life cycle model. The change in saving generated by a change in pension wealth (i.e., by the reform) is greater, the closer the individual is to retirement age. This re ects the fact that younger individuals have a longer horizon over which to absorb the "unexpected" shock to pension wealth.
The way in which the coef cient on the pension wealthincome ratio changes with age depends on the values of the parameters that characterize the utility function. When we construct our "pension wealth" variable, we take them into explicit consideration. In particular, in order to compute the implied adjustments (appropriately modi ed to consider an arbitrary length of life and a variable retirement age), we will be making speci c assumptions about the rate at which individuals discount the future and about their preferences. It is easy to show that in a more general model with N periods of work before retirement, the coef cient of the ratio of the present discounted value of bene ts to current income in equations (3) and (4) is equal to a factor k(a,d), de ned as follows:
where ra is retirement age, assumed to be xed, and a is the current age. 6 Equations (39), (49), and (40) can be generalized in a similar fashion.
In the simple model we have considered, pension wealth accrues in one period and is, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from private nancial wealth. In reality, as we men-6. We are assuming that b 1 /g (1 1 r) ( 1 2 g ) /g , 1. Under log utility, for instance, this is obviously true, as in that case d 5 b.
tioned above, this might not be the case. For one thing, public pension wealth is substantially less liquid than nancial wealth. Furthermore, it accrues over the retirement period with a predetermined pattern and, therefore, cannot be adjusted to particular changes in needs. 7 It is therefore plausible to assume that public pension wealth is not a perfect substitute of private savings. Indeed, many of the empirical studies of these issues, in the tradition of the King and Dicks-Mireaux [1982] paper, measured explicitly the degree of substitutability between pension andnancial wealth. For these reasons, in the empirical application below, we allow the coef cient on our de nition of pension wealth to be age dependent and check whether and how much it differs from minus one. In other words, we interpret the coef cient on our variable as a measure of the substitutability between pension and nancial wealth.
II.B. Empirical Speci cation
Our model is supposed to give a basic conceptual framework that allows us to interpret the results of our empirical speci cation. In particular, we model saving rates and, following the logic of the model, we regress them on the present discount value of pension bene ts divided by current income and adjusted for the factors discussed above. However, as reality is more complex than the simple model we propose, we also allow for additional controls. In particular, to capture macroeconomic shocks, we allow for year dummies, while to control for permanent differences in saving behavior across different groups, maybe induced by differences in earning pro les or preferences, we allow for group dummies. Notice that as year-of-birth cohorts are part of the group de nition, allowing for group and year dummies is equivalent to allowing for exible age effects.
8 Moreover, to capture more fully the possibility of life cycle effects, we also control for various demographic variables.
The other set of factors that are bound to be important for saving rates, according to the simple model we sketched, is the expected value of future earnings normalized by the level of current income. Individuals who expect low future earnings 7. The model we have considered also neglects uncertainty, which might affect the pattern of saving rates. Uncertainty about the sustainability of the social security system complicates the relationship further.
8. We experiment with the introduction of a term in age, however, to capture the effect of age differences within each cohort.
should save more than individuals who expect high future earnings. We capture these effects in two different ways. As we use projection of future earnings to compute expected pension wealth, we have as a by-product of our procedure some estimates of expected future earnings. As they are likely to be error-ridden, we instrument for them using the same interactions of group and time dummies that we use for pension wealth. Alternatively, we simply assume that variation in future earnings is captured by the exible age and cohort effects that we allow in our estimation. It turns out that the two procedures do not yield very different results.
To be more precise, we estimate the following equation:
where SR i, t is the saving rate for household i at time t, de ned as income minus consumption divided by income, FE is the ratio of future to current earnings, and PW i ,t is the ratio of pension wealth to current earnings adjusted following the procedure described above. u (a i ,t ) and f(a i , t ) are age and time-dependent parameters, where time dependence is relative to the date of the reform: in order to capture their variability with age, we model them both as polynomials in age and as a step function. The term x t represents time effects, and f c are group effects. X is a vector of controls that includes demographic variables such as family composition dummies.
II.C. Econometric Issues
The estimation of equation (6) on individual data poses a number of problems. As pension wealth, that is, the present discounted value of future bene ts, is not typically observed, one has to estimate it. However precise the method used in estimating such a quantity, the resulting variable is likely to be affected by measurement error, which is likely to introduce a bias in the estimated coef cients. Moreover, an additional source of bias is introduced by the possibility that individual (and unobserved) heterogeneity in saving behavior is related to the individual variables used to estimate pension wealth. To take this type of problem into account, one can use an Instrumental Variable technique, using as instruments group dummies interacted with year dummies. Groups are de ned so to capture systematic differences in social security wealth and, in particular, differences in the time evolution of such a variable. Our proposed strategy, therefore, is an application of a difference-in-difference estimator.
9 Identi cation requires that PW i t (the pension wealth variable) varies in a way that is not fully explained by group and time dummies. This hypothesis can be easily tested by checking the signi cance of interaction terms in a regression of PW i t on group, time dummies, and their interaction. The 1992 reform, which occurs in the middle of our sample period, gives us the possibility of implementing such a technique as it induced changes in pension wealth that were systematically different across the groups we considered. This variation across groups is obviously crucial for the identication of u, and therefore, we form groups in such a way as to maximize it.
As we discuss below, we have a time series of four cross sections. The rst two are before the reform, while the last two refer to the rst year after the reform and to the third year after the reform. The effect of pension wealth depends both on the age of an individual at the time of the reform and on when the individual is observed after the reform. This is apparent if we compare the expressions for age three saving rates given in equations (49) and (40). The former refers to a consumer who experiences a surprise change in period 3 of her life, while the latter refers to a consumer aged three who experiences the surprise change in period 2. Therefore, in our sample, among the "postreform" households, we have to distinguish households of a given age that are observed one (in 1993) or three years (in 1995) after the reform. If we exclude the last year of the data (i.e., we drop the year 1995), we can avoid this last adjustment, as we would have only one year "after the reform." In what follows, we present results for both cases. Signi cant differences between the two sets of results could be due to delays in the adjustment of saving rates to the changes induced by the reform.
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Estimating social security wealth is obviously quite hard. Our procedure requires knowledge of a number of legislative details, as well as some assumptions on expected earning pro les, retirement age, and so on. Furthermore, as we use social security wealth as a determinant of individual saving behavior, we would 9. See Heckman and Robb [1985] for a discussion of the method and Eissa [1995] and Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir [1998] for recent applications of the method to female labor supply behavior. Meyer [1995a Meyer [ , 1995b provides a general discussion and applications on the effects of unemployment insurance.
10. Note that our sample is, by and large, made of different individual households observed over time. However, the sample also contains a small panel component.
ideally require an estimate of social security wealth as perceived by the individual. If the social security system before (or after, for that matter) the Amato reform was widely perceived to be unsustainable, our estimates of social security wealth might deviate substantially from perceived wealth. This argument constitutes probably the most convincing reason to use average changes in estimated social security wealth to identify the relationship of such a variable with the personal saving rate. In 1991 the Italian social security system was one of the most generous in the world and clearly unsustainable in the long run. As these issues were widely debated in the time up to the reform of 1992, it is not unreasonable to think that a change in the legislation was widely expected. However, it should be stressed that the type of reform that would eventually be implemented was not obvious. In particular, it was not obvious who would be affected more by the reform and by how much. The limitations of the reform itself and the dif culties of subsequent governments in implementing further and more radical changes in 1994 and 1995 show that the political economy of the pension reform was extremely complex and characterized by outcomes that were ex ante far from obvious and anticipated. If changes in pension wealth were not fully anticipated, they could identify the relationship between public pension provision and individual saving. In any case, if households perceived the system existing before 1992 as unsustainable, the reform would not have changed their perception of social security wealth. This would make our test less powerful in that it would make it harder to identify a relationship between changes in pension wealth before and after the reform and changes in savings.
III. THE AMATO REFORM AND ITS DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS ON SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH

III.A. Household Savings in Italy
The saving behavior of Italian households has been characterized for a long time by very high saving rates. Different studies have proposed several explanations, with different degrees of plausibility. Some authors have stressed the limited development of nancial markets, and in particular of a market for housing mortgages as the most likely explanation for Italy's high saving rates. Other authors have also appealed to the presence of strong bequest motives.
11 While the fact that for Italian households it has been until very recently very hard to borrow, either to nance consumption or to purchase a house, is well established, it is dif cult to make a convincing connection between these facts and observed saving rates.
From the beginning of the 1980s, however, the saving rate of Italian households has decreased considerably. The national saving rate (adjusted for in ation and for durable purchases) has declined from a peak of 24 percent at the beginning of the 1960s to just below 10 percent in the early 1990s. The private saving rate exhibits a similar trend, though it is characterized by stronger uctuations. The Italian social security system was at the time (and still is) a patchwork of different public funds: each characterized by its own rules in terms of eligibility and bene t payments. Almost invariably changes in the social security legislation taking place after the 1950s went in the direction of increasing the generosity of the system: policy-makers engaged in a perverse struggle in order to provide advantages to one fund or the other in turn. Almost at the same time the system underwent a complete transition from being funded to becoming a Pay-AsYou-Go system. Not surprisingly, Rossi and Visco [1995] propose an explanation for the decline in the saving rate driven by the increase in public pension wealth that took place starting in the early 1970s. Their analysis is based on time series regressions and on the identi cation of long-run relationships between saving, growth, and private wealth and pension wealth. Such an approach involves computing an estimate of aggregate nancial pension wealth and necessarily neglects aggregation issues. The main idea of this test is to assess the degree of substitutability of private and pension wealth by comparing the coef cients on the two variables in a long-run consumption function. The hypothesis of full substitutability is that the two coef cients are equal. Such a hypothesis implies that large changes in social security wealth are re ected in changes in consumption.
A few studies have attempted to address these issues using Italian micro data [Brugiavini 1987; . Both these authors attempt to estimate the degree of substitutability of nancial wealth and pension wealth using just one wave of the same survey we use in this paper and obtain estimates of the 11. See, for example, Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese [1994] for the former argument and for the latter. crucial parameter much lower than those obtained by Rossi and Visco. The problems with the estimation of this type of parameters are well-known: Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1983] , for instance, discuss the dif culties with the identi cation of these parameters both in time-series and cross-sectional studies. The structural instability of the parameters is due to the changes in population structure and to the uctuations in interest rates as well as in contribution rates during the transition after the introduction of a new pension system and its subsequent changes.
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In this paper we propose tests that take a different direction. Rather than rely on estimates of the degree of substitutability between private and pension wealth, our tests look directly at how changes in saving rates are related to changes in pension wealth. As we discuss above, the Amato reform gives us the instrument to identify this relationship.
III.B. Institutional Details
The 1992 reform of the Italian social security system 13 mainly concerned the basic social security system and set out some of the principles for the partial introduction of fully funded occupational pensions. The Italian social security system is made up of three major funds: private sector employees (contributing to the INPS fund 14 ), public sector employees, and the self-employed. The changes introduced by the reform focused on the criteria of eligibility for old age and early retirement pensions and the size of the bene t outlays. In particular, the reform envisioned, once phased in, the following:
c an increase in the normal retirement age in the private sector and for the self-employed, from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 60 for women, for the public sector the normal retirement age was already 65. c an increase in the minimum number of years of social security tax payments from fteen to twenty.
12. Samwick [2000] also looks, in a panel of countries, at structural reforms which go in the direction of reducing the PAYG component of the old age insurance program in favor of a funded component. However, his data set presents similar aggregation problems of the type discussed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff, and the author himself questions the robustness of his results.
13. The text of the Law can be found in Istituto Poligra co e Zecca dello Stato (1992). The system was changed again in 1995 by the Dini government. We will not discuss the changes introduced by the Dini reform here.
14. INPS stands for Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale (National Institute for Social Security). Private sector employees are in fact a subset of this fund, known as private sector employees fund: INPS-FPLD.
c the limit of 35 years of contribution for eligibility to an early retirement option was extended to all funds, hence restricting access to early retirement particularly for workers in the public sector.
15 c a reduction in bene ts for all three funds, achieved by replacing a pension calculation, which was previously of a nal salary type (average of last ve years' gross earnings), with a career average earnings calculation (bene ts to be computed as a fraction of the average earnings over the entire working life of an individual).
16 Table I summarizes the "steady state" effects of the Amato reform for different groups of workers. However, it should be stressed that the reform was supposed to be fully phased in only after 2032 and a transitional period was envisioned. The rules in place for the transitional period affected the normal retirement age, the bene t calculation, and the access to early retirement on the basis of seniority, i.e., on the basis of accrued rights in 1992. For senior workers (those who had accrued fteen years of contributions in 1993) the increase in normal retirement age was introduced only gradually, the bene t calculation rules were almost untouched and, most importantly, restrictions on eligibility to early retirement were implemented very gradually.
Hence the transitional period left almost unaffected social security rights for workers who were on the verge of retirement while greatly affecting younger workers. Younger workers were potentially losing a substantial share of their pension wealth from the reform, particularly if their age-earnings pro le was suf ciently steep. It is relevant to note that the seniority criterion outlined above does not affect only the very young, i.e., those entering the labor market in 1993, but to a larger extent those who had contributed to the system for a substantial number of years in 1992.
The transition period, therefore, implied that different groups of workers were affected, in terms of pension wealth, in radically different ways, over and above the differential effect 15. This is a peculiar feature of the Italian Social Security system: the early retirement option allowed workers to retire at any age if they had completed a given number of years of tax payments. This eligibility requirement varied between funds: 35 years for men and women in the private sector, twenty years for men in the public sector and fteen years for women in the public sector.
16. Years with particularly low income were excluded from the computations. Past earnings were converted to current prices using the rate of in ation of the CPI. a. To be more speci c, this is 65 for Central Government Employees and 60 for Local Government Employees. However, a public sector employee could easily get around the eligibility requirement due to the early retirement option.
b. The pensionable earnings calculation is actually made on a monthly basis both in the private sector (where we talk about last ve year's earnings for expositional convenience) and in the public sector. c. For further details on the Amato reform, see Brugiavini [1999] and Brugiavini and Fornero [2001] .
implied by the way in which the reform changed the existing legislation in the steady state. In subsection III.D we describe in detail the changes experienced in 1992 by different groups.
III.C. Some Preliminary Evidence
In what follows, we estimate for the households in our data set the value of pension wealth, taking into account all the institutional details discussed above and relate these estimates to their saving behavior. Before embarking on the discussion of our estimates of household pension wealth, it is worth exploiting some of the aspects of the reform which naturally divide our households into groups on which the effect of the reform was substantially different. In particular, individuals with more than or less than fteen years of contributions experienced a differential treatment in the overall generosity and eligibility requirements. While, in what follows, we exploit these differences to maximize the differences in pension wealth changes across our groups, in this subsection we use regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of the reform on saving rates. The advantage of this procedure is that it does not require an estimate of pension wealth. The possible disadvantage relative to the more structural evidence we present below is that this procedure might yield less precise estimates and does not quantify the degree of substitutability between pension wealth and saving.
We split the sample between the households headed by an individual with more than or less than fteen years of contributions in 1992. We then run a nonparametric regression of saving rates (obtained as income minus consumption over income) on tenure (de ned as the number of years of contributions to the social security system for the head of the household) for each of these two groups in 1993 and 1991 and evaluate the conditional expectation at sixteen and fourteen years of tenure, respectively. 17 If we de ne with sr y (i,t) the saving rate of a household belonging to group y (less than fteen years of tenure in 1992) with i years of tenure at time t and with sr o (i,t), the corresponding quantity for a household belonging to group o (more than fteen years of tenure in 1992) the effect of interest is obtained as 17. We experimented with different values of the bandwidth parameter, and we chose the standard value obtained for the normal Kernel whereby the bandwidth depends on the sample size and the standard deviation of the independent variable h 5 1.06s(n) 2 1 / 5 , as this did not seem to impose excessive smoothing.
@sr y~1 6,93! 2 sr o~1 6,93!# 2 @sr y~1 4,91! 2 sr o~1 4,91!#, where sr y and sr o are the tted values of the nonparametric regressions for the individuals with less ( y) and more (o) than fteen years of contributions in 1992. We compute the standard errors of these effects by bootstrapping our sample, also taking into account individual level clusters for the panel component of the sample.
When applied to the whole sample of private sector and public sector employees, we get an effect of 0.049 with a standard error of 0.098. As the effect of the reform was much higher on public sector employees, we redo the exercise for this group and for the private sector employees separately. For the former we obtain an effect of 0.17 with a standard error of 0.091. For the latter group we obtain an effect of 0.090 with a standard error of 0.080.
This constitutes a rst piece of evidence, albeit imprecise, that the Amato reform had a differential effect on individuals whose pension wealth changed differently as a consequence of the reform. To better quantify this effect, we use explicit estimates of pension wealth, whose estimation we now proceed to discuss.
III.D. Estimates of Public Pension Wealth and the Effect of the Amato Reform
As our purpose is to relate individual public pension wealth and individual saving rates, we need a microeconomic data set. We use the 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995 Survey on Household Income and Wealth conducted by the Bank of Italy (SHIW). These surveys, described in detail in the Appendix, contain information on saving (de ned as income minus consumption) as well as on a variety of other variables (such as occupation, age, other demographics, and labor market behavior). The information contained in the survey allows us to compute, for each income recipient, an estimate of his or her public pension wealth before and after the reform.
Obviously, in estimating household pension wealth, we have to make a number of strong assumptions. While not unreasonable, they can be criticized for a variety of reasons. It should be stressed, however, that for the estimation strategy pursued in this paper, as we use a difference-in-difference estimator, what is relevant is not that we get the level of pension wealth exactly right, but rather that we estimate without systematic biases the differential changes in pension wealth induced by the 1992 pension reform.
Finally, some would argue that Italian households were "overannuitized," and the reform, by reducing annuitized resources, would have taken households closer to their optimal provision for retirement with a reduced impact on current consumption and saving. It is hard to assess the validity of this argument, but two considerations are in order: while it may be true that some workers would rather move to a more funded system, once contributions have been paid into the system (the payroll tax was 22 percent of gross earnings at the time of the reform), a reduction in future bene ts was essentially a wealth tax. Even worse, younger workers, who had not yet accrued substantial rights, were expected to pay higher payroll taxes and receive less generous pensions as a result of the reform. If anything, the attitude seemed to take advantage of the generosity of the system by claiming early retirement as soon as possible (see Brugiavini [1999] ).
Each component of the Amato reform has a different effect on each of the groups we consider. In many cases it is not obvious to compute the net combined effect of the many changes induced by the reform on pension wealth. Some broad patterns, however, are quite clear and have been discussed in the literature.
Peracchi and talk of a "wealth tax" imposed by the reform on the active population, referring to the change in the bene t computation method, which mainly affects younger generations. The redistribution brought about by the reform across sectors is a bit more complex: it is clear that the change in the minimum number of years of contributions to obtain early retirement bene ts hits the public sector employees. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the changes in the early retirement benet for the public sector were, at the time following the reform, one of the most debated issues. It can safely be assumed that the households headed by a public sector employee were acutely aware of the implications of the new rules. More generally, it can be argued that public-sector employees were the group that most enjoyed the generosity of the Italian social security system in the prereform regime and were presumably most affected by the changes. It is this type of variability that allows us to perform our tests.
It should be added that an abrupt recession episode took place in 1993 in Italy, marked by a fall in consumer expenditure and in household disposable income. The implicit assumption we are making is that the recession episode did not affect the groups we are considering in different ways, at least for those variables that are important determinants of savings. Miniaci and Weber [1999] analyze in detail this episode and write explicitly about the pension reform and identify it as one of the main forces behind the change in observed saving rates.
The research strategy we use is based on dividing the sample into a number of groups chosen to maximize the variation, across groups, in pension wealth changes induced by the reform. 18 The institutional details discussed above were therefore crucial in forming the de nition of the groups. We divide the sample on the basis of year of birth (cohort) 19 and sector of activity of the household head. We divide the active population into three large groups: private sector employees (who participate in what is known as FPLD-the Italian acronym for private employees fund-see note 4 above), public sector employees, and other, including mainly the self-employed. 20 In addition, we have the pensioners' group, which is affected by the reform only through the indexation of future bene ts. As far as the de nition of cohorts is concerned, we consider four large groups de ned on the basis of the year of birth of the household head: those born in 1903-1934, those born in 1935-1944, those born in 1945-1957 , and those born after 1957. These intervals were chosen so to match the crucial seniority levels used in the new regime discussed above. Further details on the de nition of cohorts are provided in the Appendix. Mean values for the relevant variables are contained in Table VIII also in the Appendix.
As we have information on education levels and occupation of 18. The hypothesis that group membership is constant over time is particularly problematic for young and old households, as household headship might change endogenously with age at the beginning and at the end of the life cycle, as household formation and dissolution are endogenous to saving decisions. This consideration should make us cautious in interpreting the results we present below.
19. While in estimating earnings growth, we use up to seven cohorts, we use only four cohorts in forming groups to obtain instruments for the changes in pension wealth. These were chosen according to the "seniority" rules described above.
20. In this group we also have included employees who do not belong to the major social security administration Private Sector Employees Fund (INPS), such as managers, journalists, actors, and a few other employees. both spouses, in principle it would be possible to de ne ner and more homogeneous groups. In particular, households could be divided, for instance, also on the basis of the spouse occupation, age, and education and not only on the characteristics of the household head. The problem with such a strategy, of course, is that of having extremely small, if not empty, cells. A much larger sample would allow us a much more ef cient identi cation of groups.
In Table II we report averages of net household pension wealth and saving rates for the years before and the years after the reform for different cohorts and occupational groups; while in Table III we compute percentage changes in mean values for the same variables (net pension wealth and saving rates) between two years of the survey for each group. The main message from these tables is that there is a substantial decline in pension wealth between 1991 and 1993. Moreover, there are marked differences in how the reform affects different cohorts and occupational groups. Notice, for instance, the large negative effect of the pension reform on younger cohorts and on public sector employees (but young self-employed workers are also substantially affected). In Panel B of Table III we notice that, in 1993, for some groups there is an increase in saving rates, while for others there is a decline. Public sector employees, for instance, are the group that shows the largest positive changes in saving rates. The numbers in Table III can be further explored to provide, before moving to our more formal analysis in the following section, some preliminary evidence about the relationship between pension wealth and saving. In Figure I we plot the change in the median saving rate for each of the cohort/occupation groups we consider against the change in average pension wealth for the same groups. The analysis in Section IV identi es in a more Mean saving rates are computed as mean saving over mean income. Net social security wealth is the present discounted value of future bene ts minus contributions due. For the youngest cohort there are a few heads of household collecting bene ts, but these are typically not old age bene ts. This is why the row for the youngest cohort in the group "retired" appears empty both in Panel A and in Panel B. The group of retired households is not used in the econometric analysis. rigorous fashion and quanti es the relationship between savings and pension out of the relative variation in pension wealth. In Figure I , however, we show that such a relationship is already visible in this simple picture: there is a negative relationship between the changes in saving rates and the changes in pension wealth. Although a clear pattern does not emerge for all groups, a cluster of cohorts whose members are employees in the public sector (groups 12, 22, 32, and 42, respectively) tend to have marked negative changes in median pension wealth associated with positive changes in saving rates.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF PENSION WEALTH ON SAVING RATES
Having measured pension wealth for each household in the sample before and after the Amato reform and having described Figure I shows changes in median saving rates against changes in median pension wealth on the sample of active households (nonpensioners) for the four years (four data points in each group are lost in taking differences). Pension wealth has been rescaled before taking the differences and is in thousands of 1994 million lira. The numbers in the scatter diagram represent the groups: for example, 13 stands for cohort 1 (youngest cohort) in occupation 3 (occupation other). The regression is based on 33 observations, and the estimated slope is 20.153 (s.e. 5 0.099).
FIGURE I Changes in Median Saving Rate against Changes in Median Pension Wealth
how average changes in this variable are related to average changes in saving for different groups, we are now in a position to move to a more structured analysis. As we discussed above, we use a simple regression framework. In particular, for each household in the sample, we relate saving rates to pension wealth and future earnings, both of which are corrected by the factor specied in equation (5). These two variables are interacted, in most speci cations, with age dummies. The interaction with age of the pension wealth variable allows the degree of substitutability between pension and nancial wealth to be age dependent. In addition, we add year dummies to capture aggregate effects, group dummies to control for xed group effects and a term in age to capture differences in age within each cohort.
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In order to account for the effects of demographic variables on saving rates, we experimented with two sets of variables. In one speci cation we make use of the number of children in the household (as a percentage of total household members) and number of income recipients (also in percentage terms). This is to capture the possibility that within-household redistribution takes place, particularly if more income recipients are coresident. We also use dummies for education attainment (no education or elementary education, secondary education, university degree), these should be relevant both for shaping preferences for saving, e.g., vis-à -vis precautionary saving, and to proxy for a general "level of welfare" measure. We cannot argue, as in Gale [1998] , that speci cally nancial literacy would play a role, as we are not looking in any way at private pension plans, nor do we consider portfolio composition. Hence education plays a role more as a proxy for welfare conditions, which is why we experiment with different sets of demographic variables and, taken as a group, these could also help to capture the existence of liquidity constraints. We estimate our speci cations on the subsample of the active population including all workers and report our estimation results in Tables IV to VII. Each table contains four columns corresponding to the cases with and without the year 1995 and with and without future earnings. When we exclude future earnings, we assume that their effect is captured by group and time dummies. We have a slight preference for the results that exclude 21. As groups are de ned, among other things, by year-of-birth cohorts, group, and time effects span, for the most part age effects. Age only captures differences in age within a cohort, as this is de ned by an interval of years.
1995, as for the households observed in that year, we should take into account the fact that they experienced the reform three years in advance, while those in 1993, experienced the reform the previous year.
In all speci cations the left-hand side of the equation is the saving rate de ned as income minus consumption divided by income. Pension wealth and future human wealth (when included) are both adjusted with the factor reported in equation (5), with g 5 1 and b 5 0.98. In the tables we only report the coef cients on pension wealth and future earnings, the coefcients on the year dummies, and the other relevant explanatory variables. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we also provide the total sample average of the coef cient on pension wealth.
We estimate the coef cients of interest by Instrumental Variables, using as instruments the interaction of time and group dummies. To check the rank condition on this estimator, we regress our estimates of pension wealth on time and group dummies and their interactions and test for the signi cance of the interaction terms. We reject the null at any sensible level of signi cance (F(33, 18546) 5 12.28). In Table IV we regress saving rates on pension wealth and on demographics by using the full set of instrumental variables, which include the interaction of year dummies with cohort-occupation dummies. With the exception of column 1 (all years, no future earnings), the coef cient of (adjusted) pension wealth is not signi cantly different from zero and its point estimate is small (0.03).
In Table V we adopt the same procedure as in Table IV , but let the coef cient on pension wealth be dependent on age, to allow for the possibility that the degree of substitutability between nancial and pension wealth changes over the life cycle. The results we obtain indicate a substantial amount of substitutability for some age groups and little for others, as we strongly reject the null that the coef cient on pension wealth is the same for different age groups. We plot the coef cients on pension wealth of columns 1 and 3 in the top panels of Figures II (a similar picture can be obtained for the coef cients in columns 2 and 4). We notice a somewhat puzzling U-shaped age pattern, in that the youngest and oldest households seem to have the lowest degree of substitutability between pension and nancial wealth. While one could imagine that the low degree of substitutability for young households could be explained by liquidity constraints, it is harder to tell a story to explain the pattern observed for older households. It should be stressed that, at least for some specications, the degree of substitutability for the middle-aged households is very high, and close to 21. These numbers are much higher than what was found by previous researchers, with the possible exception of Gale [1998] and, on aggregate time series data, Feldstein [1974] .
The variability that identi es the parameter of interest in Table V is the interaction between time and group effect, where groups are de ned by the interaction of cohort and occupation groups. The identifying assumption is that there are no group/ Saving rates are de ned as (Income 2 Consumption)/Income. Pension wealth is de ned as net pension wealth over current income by 1000. Expected future earnings are the present value of future earnings over current earnings by 1000. Reference categories for the dummy variables are "no education or low education" and "year 1989." Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors, allowing for cluster effects based on cohort-occupation groups.
time-speci c effects on savings. In Table VI we somewhat relax this assumption and include as controls in the regression dummies for the interaction between years and cohorts only. There- Saving rates are de ned as (Income 2 Consumption)/Income. Pension wealth (PW) is de ned as net pension wealth over current income by 1000. Expected future earnings (FE) are the present value of future earnings over current earnings by 1000. Reference categories for the dummy variables are "no education or low education" and "year 1989." Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors, allowing for cluster effects based on cohort-occupation groups.
fore, the parameters of interest are identi ed through the year and occupation interaction.
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This speci cation, which would be the right one in the presence of cohort-speci c effects of, say, the 1993 recession, yields larger substitutability for young groups and a limited effect for older groups. The interactions of time and cohort dummies are statistically signi cant, perhaps signaling that different cohorts were indeed affected by the recession in different ways. We plot 22. The rank condition is again satis ed. The F-statistic for the hypothesis that time p occupation effects in pension wealth are zero after controlling for time, group, and time p cohort interaction is F(6, 18573) 5 2.29 which has a p-value of 0.0328. Figure II contains the estimated coef cient against age for the full sample of four years and for the speci cations containing interaction terms of pension wealth with age dummies. Top-left panel: speci cation with no future earnings (Table V, column 1); top right panel: speci cation with future earnings (Table V, column 3); (3) bottom-left panel: speci cation without future earnings with year p cohort used as control (Table VI, column 1); and (4) bottom right panel: specication with future earnings and year p cohort used as controls (Table VI, Saving rates are de ned as (Income 2 Consumption)/Income. Pension wealth (PW) is de ned as net pension wealth over current income by 1000. Expected future earnings (FE) are the present value of future earnings over current earnings by 1000. Reference categories for the dummy variables are "no education or low education" and "year 1989." Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors according to cluster effects based on cohort-occupation groups. Saving rates are de ned as (Income 2 Consumption)/Income. Pension wealth (PW) is de ned as net pension wealth over current income by 1000. Expected future earnings (FE) are the present value of future earnings over current earnings by 1000. Reference categories for the dummy variables are "no education or low education" and "year 1989." Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors, allowing for cluster effects based on cohort-occupation groups. the coef cients on pension wealth in columns 1 and 3, which are now identi ed only by the variation induced by the reform across education groups, in the bottom panel of Figure II . The age pattern of the substitutability between savings and pension wealth is now monotone in the speci cation without future earnings, in that the only groups that seem to have low substitutability of pension and nancial saving are, surprisingly, the older consumers.
FIGURE II Life Cycle Pattern of the Estimated Substitution Coef cient
Finally, in Table VII we introduce the interaction of occupation and years as controls, while excluding the interaction of year and cohorts. Identi cation is now obtained through the interaction of years and cohorts. We nd that future pension wealth is completely insigni cant. On the other hand, the occupation p year effects are not statistically signi cant in our regression. These results might not be surprising as the identi cation of age-speci c coef cients on pension wealth is problematic, as we are using cohort-speci c variation only at one point in time.
To summarize, when we allow the degree of substitutability between nancial and pension wealth to be a function of age, in both samples and for most speci cations, we nd a signi cant and sizable offset of the pension wealth variable on the saving rate of the expected sign. However, the point estimates are usually above minus one, indicating less than perfect substitutability between pension and nancial wealth. Moreover, there is considerable variation in the size of this coef cient across ages and speci cations. As is evident in Figure II , where we plot ũ (a i , t ), the coefcient on pension wealth is much higher in absolute value over the 40 -50 age interval, as it may be expected if liquidity constraints are relevant for the youngest individuals. The consistently low substitutability between pension and nancial wealth we estimate for the older consumers (above 50) is somewhat puzzling, as this group should not be affected by liquidity constraints. One possibility is that we are somehow misestimating the adjustment factor (see equation (5)) and that this bias affects more the cohorts who are closer to retirement. The degree of substitutability for the youngest individuals depends on whether we add controls for cohort p year effects. When we do, we nd much higher substitutability.
As for the differences across speci cations, the coef cient on pension wealth is much closer to 21 in the speci cations that includes the estimates of future earnings, than in those where the latter is proxied by age effects. 23 In particular, when we exclude future earnings, the estimated coef cient is never smaller than 20.3 or 20.4, while in the second speci cation for the middleaged groups, is not signi cantly different from 21.
It should be stressed that our results, which are directly derived from the simple life cycle model sketched in Section II, are not directly comparable to previous results obtained in the literature, as we make use of the saving rate as a dependent variable, rather than regressing the stock of private wealth against the stock of pension wealth. To ease the interpretation, we have attempted a miniature policy experiment. Take the average individual, who is characterized by the mean value of continuous variables and the reference category for the dummy variables (e.g., year 1989, no or low education, etc.) . Suppose that the ratio of pension wealth over current income increases by 10 percent (for given current income this corresponds, for such representative individual, to an approximate increase of 150 million lira in pension wealth). If we feed this change through our estimates for the average individual, everything else being equal, we obtain a saving rate which goes from 0.0865 to 0.044 (a reduction of approximately 50 percentage points). This is quite dramatic, and it shows that the impact of the change is most felt. Obviously, it cannot be generalized to the entire sample or to the population at large. Given the nonlinearity of the relationships involved, it is also hard to provide a round number for the effects in terms of changes in the aggregate capital stock.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have estimated the effect that public pension wealth has on personal household saving. For this purpose we have studied the 1992 Italian pension reform. This episode is particularly useful for several reasons. First of all, we have two large and consistent household surveys that immediately precede and follow the reform. Second, the reform did not change the nature of the pension system, in that the Italian system remained an unfunded de ned-bene ts system. The 1992 reform, however, 23. It should be noted that the identi cation of the coef cients on future earnings is problematic, as it is not clear that there exists exogenous variation of the kind we use to identify the coef cient on pension wealth.
substantially changed the present discounted wealth of a large majority of Italian households. Furthermore, and more importantly for our purposes, the reduction in public pension wealth was far from uniform across households. It is the variability in the changes in pension wealth across well-de ned groups of Italian households that we exploit to identify the effect that pension wealth has on saving rates.
The rst step of our exercise consists of the estimation of the level of pension wealth for each household included in our samples, before and after the reform. This is done at the individual level by using the information on the relevant pension law as well as extrapolation of the levels of earning and some assumptions about retirement ages.
The results indicate that pension wealth is a substitute for private nancial wealth (more speci cally for private saving), especially for individuals in the middle of their life cycle. Our assessment of how good a substitute, however, depends crucially on the speci cation we use. When we include an explicit estimate of future earnings along with our estimate of future pension wealth, we obtain that for some age groups, pension wealth is a perfect substitute for nancial wealth. However, when we proxy such a variable with age effects, we nd much lower estimates of the degree of substitutability. For the same age group a lira of pension wealth is worth at most 0.4 lira of saving.
Our estimates of the degree of substitutability depend also on which of the two samples we use and on the particular parameterization. For the larger sample it is on average 20.30 and 20.4 in the smaller sample when pension wealth is interacted with an age polynomial, while when interacting pension wealth with age dummies, for the larger sample we obtain an estimate of an average effect of 20.35 (and as large as 20.71 in the smaller sample).
Our results constitute one of the rst pieces of evidence in the European literature derived from micro data on the relationship between the provision of social security and household saving. In this sense, they complement the time-series evidence provided by Feldstein [1974] and many other authors. They also provide information on the importance of life cycle saving, and more generally, on the validity of the life cycle model of consumption.
APPENDIX
A. The Survey of Household Income and Wealth
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) is conducted, since 1987, every other year and has been widely used by several researchers to analyze the saving behavior of Italian households. For a detailed analysis of the features of the sample, see Brandolini and Cannari [1994] . In this Appendix we brie y describe the de nitions and the selection criteria we use.
The survey contains detailed information on household income, consumption, and wealth, as well as a number of demographic and economic variables. While the information on consumption is less detailed than that available in other surveys (such as the U. K. Family Expenditure Survey and the U. S. Consumer Expenditure Survey or even the Survey on Household Consumption in Italy), it is, however, suf cient to construct savings ows as disposable income minus consumption expenditure. The data are generally of excellent quality and have been used for a variety of different studies. 24 Although the saving rate in the survey is higher than the national saving rate, the difference between the two estimates is broadly consistent over time and should not affect our econometric exercise (see Brugiavini and Padula [2001] ). Since 1989, the survey also contains a (relatively small) longitudinal component.
The main advantage of the Survey for our study is the fact that it was conducted in 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995 , that is, before and after the Amato reform of the pension system. We do not make direct use of the longitudinal component of the survey (even though we correct the standard errors for the fact that some households appear in both time periods we use). In fact, the advantage of having a longitudinal component is not a large one, as we focus on differences across groups, and therefore it will be suf cient to compare means across groups and not necessarily follow the same individuals over time. In our empirical exercise in addition to the demographic variables, we use the information available on consumption and disposable income. Income is observable in two components: labor earnings and other income.
24. Of particular interest, because of their originality, are the modules on households' expectations and on cash balances. In what follows, we use the data on expected retirement age. Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure capital gains (or losses) on assets owned by the households.
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Consumption is measured as an expenditure on durables and nondurables and services over the last year. While this division is not very ne, it allows us, at least in principle, to isolate the saving component of the expenditure on durables. Ideally, one would like to add to consumption the service ow from durables. As there is almost no information on the stock of durables, this is not feasible. We therefore use two alternative de nitions of consumption and therefore saving. We rst include durables in consumption and then in saving. However, we only report results for the former de nition as there is no appreciable change.
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In addition to consumption and income and the variables that are used to de ne the groups (such as head of the household's age, occupation, and level of education), we also use other variables of particular interest for our analysis, such as the information on planned retirement age. Unfortunately, some of the variables observed in 1991, which could have been useful for our analysis, were not collected in all the other years. In particular, in 1993 there is no information on income uncertainty and on the expected replacement rates at retirement. 27 Information on this last variable, in particular, would have allowed us, on the one hand, to identify the households whose expected (or perceived) pension wealth had declined the most as a consequence of the 1992 reform and, on the other hand, to relate these changes to their saving behavior. The information on uncertainty would have allowed us to check the hypothesis that the increase in saving in 1993 was due to an increase in the precautionary motive (although this question was not asked of the entire sample to start with). The sample size effectively used (after estimation of pension wealth) is 14,522 households in 1989, 1991, and 1993, and 18,598 households in total for the four years. We excluded households where some of the crucial information was missing, 25. We do not correct for in ation on assets denominated in nominal terms. As in ation was relatively low over the period considered, we do not think this is too important.
26. As we consider group means, it should be remembered that durable expenditure contains, at the individual level, many zeros. A possible interpretation of the procedure that includes durable expenditure into consumption is that the average expenditure approximates durable services for that group.
27. Furthermore, only part of the sample answers the questions on income uncertainty, and this would make the sample size too small for our application.
particularly the information necessary to identify groups, the information on consumption, the information necessary to gross up income (see below), and to compute social security wealth.
B. Group De nitions
There are two levels to the analysis. At a rst level we distinguish groups of workers in order to model earnings growth; at a second level we de ne groups in order to estimate the effect of changes in pension wealth on saving rates. The two sets of de nitions are consistent; however, we use a ner grouping at the former level than at the latter. In particular, at the rst level we distinguish seven cohorts, gender, three occupational categories, and three education levels. At the second level we focus our attention on the household rather than on the individual, and given the reduction in sample size, we form groups based only on the age of the head of the household, and we reduce the number of cohorts to four. The de nition of cohort in the second stage was chosen in order to match the seniority levels in 1993 that triggered changes in the treatment of past contribution according to the Amato reform.
C. -Year-of-Birth-Cohorts
In the estimation of the age-earnings pro le, we use seven year-of-birth cohorts: the focus here was to de ne cohorts in order to capture productivity changes. The choice of the size of each cohort is partially constrained by the coding of age contained in the SHIW before the 1984 Survey, where age was provided in xed bands of approximately ten years each. Ideally, in order to measure earnings' growth, one would like to follow each cohort back in time as far as possible. In the SHIW this is not possible in a direct way because individuals within a given age-band could belong to more than one cohort. In order to overcome this problem, we adopted a simple weighted average measure of mean (median) earnings, which provides unbiased estimates of the actual mean (median) earnings of each cohort in each year. The cohorts we use are the following: workers born before 1918, those born between 1918 and 1924, those born between 1925 and 1933, between 1934 and 1940, between 1941 and 1949, between 1950 and 1955, and after 1955. A slightly different approach is taken when relating saving rates to pension wealth (and other controls). As explained in the text, for the instrumenting strategy we pursue, what matters there is that we match the seniority levels in 1992 in order to maximize the differences in the effect of the reform on pension wealth. Hence we consider four groups: those born in 1903-1934, those born in 1935-1944, those born in 1945-1957 and those born after 1957.
D. -Occupational Category (Groups)
We group workers according to the social security fund they contribute to. The SHIW provides occupation and industry for each worker; however, these do not allow us to identify the worker's social security fund in all cases. While it is relatively straightforward to identify public sector employees and, to a lesser extent, private sector employees, it is much harder to classify the selfemployed. After several attempts we have decided to consider the self-employed group as the residual group. This means that while a large fraction of workers in this group are self-employed proper, a small fraction belong to other funds. The details of this choice are given below.
E. Public Sector Employees
These correspond to employees whose contributions are collected by the Treasury Fund and the Government Employees Fund (known as INPDAP). Occupations are, for example, civil servants, employees in the army, employees in the national health service, etc. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to distinguish a group of private sector employees who provide "house help" and are improperly included in the public sector.
F. Private Sector Employees
(INPS-FPLD-National Institute for Social Security-Private Sector Employees Fund). This group mainly consists of bluecollar and white-collar employees. Between 1991 and 1993 a change in the occupational categories coding occurs, which provides a ner disaggregation. However, we could not exploit this new feature of the survey, and for coherence, we had to stick to the 1991 coding frame. We exclude from this private sector employees group top-level managers: these pay contributions to a special fund (known as INPDAI) which we include in the selfemployed group.
G. Retired
We use both an earnings criterion and a self-reported characteristic. We consider retired all individuals who are not active and are self-reported retired and do not receive earnings. These are not necessarily all old-age pensioners, as there could be DI pensioners or young people drawing a survivor's bene t.
H. Other
These are mainly self-employed individuals. A few other people receiving earnings from employment fall within this group: top-level managers and other special funds (e.g., actors). Hence, this is essentially a residual group. The reason for this choice is twofold: on the one hand, we need groups that are exhaustive of the population; on the other hand, it is crucial to have a satisfactory sample size. Nothing would prevent us from distinguishing a smaller group of actual self-employed individuals, plus de ne a fth group of others. However, the information provided in SHIW would not allow for the identi cation of some of the activities in self-employment, particularly in the arts and crafts categories. Hence by following this approach, we would suffer from two drawbacks: on the one hand, the self-employed group would be rather small; and, on the other hand, we would leave out some important groups of self-employed workers.
I. Educational Groups
These enter both at the rst level of the analysis (earnings projections) and as instruments in some of the speci cations we estimate. The educational groups we consider are roughly comparable to the following U. S. categories: (1) No education-high school dropouts, (2) a secondary level education which we could call "some college," and (3) college graduates and above. The age earnings pro les for the highly educated group are much steeper: this has direct implications for the earnings growth parameter entering the computation of social security wealth.
K. Net Pension Wealth
Household's pension wealth is de ned as the present expected value of future social security bene ts to which both spouses are entitled, evaluated at the current age of the head of the household. This is the sum of old age pension wealth of husband and wife plus pension wealth to the surviving spouse. We use both a gross pension wealth de nition and a net pension wealth one: the latter is obtained by subtracting from gross pension wealth the expected value of future social security taxes that a worker pays from his current age until retirement. 28 We adopt exactly the same de nition as in Feldstein [1974] ; however, for the reasons given below, we do not require that the earnings growth rate and the discount factor take the same value.
In order to estimate pension wealth for workers, we project forward gross earnings to retirement age and then apply the rules in place in each year to compute the rst yearly bene t. This requires a number of steps. First, the SHIW contains net earnings (these are after income tax and after social security tax), while for bene t computation we need gross earnings. Hence, in order to gross up earnings, we impute for each worker in the survey the income tax and the social security tax paid by the worker (excluding the tax paid by the employer). This procedure is rather complex because the income tax schedule is highly nonlinear and contains many different tax rebates (details can be obtained from the authors upon request). Once gross earnings in the survey year are obtained, we need to make assumptions on earnings growth for each individual. We set up an econometric speci cation delivering age-earnings pro les for different genderoccupation-education groups based on time series of cross sections of the SHIW going back to 1978. This shows a marked difference in the yearly growth rate of real earnings for different cohorts: younger cohorts start higher and have steeper age-earnings pro les.
Hence we use cohort-speci c growth rates: overall, these range between around 1 percent to 3 percent for older cohorts to about 6 -7 percent for younger cohorts of individuals with higher education. There is very little evidence on age-earnings pro les for Italian workers, and very few studies account for cohort speci c growth rates. Our results are broadly consistent with what was found by Lucifora and Rappelli [1995] in a study based on 28. The social security tax rate for employees ranges between 7.45 percent of gross earnings in 1991 to 8.34 percent in 1993. Hence the present value of future taxes, up to retirement age, is a rather small fraction of gross pension wealth. This is because, as explained in the text, we gross up net earnings taking into consideration only the tax rate of the worker, while we disregard the tax rate of the employer. Hence we also exclude future social security taxes of the employer, which amount to approximately 17 percent of gross earnings. panel data drawn from administrative records of private sector employees. Their results are comparable to our estimates as they also distinguish cohorts, gender, and occupational groups.
Finally, we x the retirement age of each worker at the expected retirement age directly elicited from respondents in the survey questionnaire.
This procedure gave us the rst yearly bene t for each individual by implementing the bene t calculation rules prevailing under each legislation (we also took account of the existence of a minimum-level-bene t, in those cases where the computed benet was very low, and bene t capping, if applicable). In order to compute pension wealth, we then applied the appropriate growth rate to social security bene ts-according to the prevailing rule-up to a maximum age of 100. Italian government actuaries have often used a real earnings growth rate of 1.5 percent in their macro-simulations of future social security expenditures: we take this assumption for the earnings growth rate entering the pension indexation rule for all retirees (only in 1991). We use a real discount rate of 3 percent, and apply survival probabilities by age and gender drawn from the Italian Life Tables.
For pensioners the procedure is much simpler, as we only need to project forward the actual bene t and apply the relevant survival probability.
Social security taxes are the present (at retirement) value of a constant fraction of earnings that workers are expected to pay between the current age and retirement, conditional upon survival. There is a discrete jump in the social security tax levied on workers between the years 1991 and 1993, which makes the use of net social security wealth interesting for this paper. Social security taxes are certainly expected to grow in real terms over the years, and by keeping the tax rate constant after 1993, we are probably underestimating the value of social security taxes, particularly for young workers.
Our estimates of the level of household social security wealth (in 1994 lira) are higher than obtained in previous studies (see, for example, Jappelli [1995] ). However, this is easily justi ed: we use gross earnings rather than net earnings; we use cohortgender-occupation speci c growth rates in earnings, rather than a at growth rate; and nally, we explicitly account for bene ts to the surviving spouse, which were previously neglected. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that what matters for our estimation strategy is the difference between groups and over time in pension wealth, rather than the actual level of pension wealth. Our construction of pension wealth is carried out consistently in both years-even though allowing for changes brought about by the reform. 
